Build a path from verified signatures
Issuer and subject names help find possible links, but names alone do not prove that one certificate signed another. The workbench verifies candidate signatures and orders a unique supplied path where possible. A missing intermediate leaves a partial chain; several valid issuer candidates can leave the order ambiguous.
Supply the expected root through the separate trust-anchor input only after obtaining it through a trusted channel. Merely including a self-signed root in an ordinary bundle does not establish trust. The tool does not download missing intermediates or choose public roots from a system store.
Read identity, usage and time as separate findings
SAN matching compares a requested hostname or IP with the selected leaf certificate. A wildcard such as *.example.test covers one label, such as app.example.test, but not the bare example.test or two labels such as a.b.example.test. The common-name field is not used as a fallback.
The validity result uses your device clock unless you provide a full UTC timestamp. Expiry, not-yet-valid status, server-authentication EKU and relevant key usage are reported separately. Selecting the wrong certificate or using an incorrect clock can produce a misleading deployment decision even when parsing succeeds.
Finish with an actual deployment check
A successful local path check is limited to supplied roots, signatures, supported constraints and the chosen time. Browser trust policy, revocation, Certificate Transparency, server-side key installation and the certificates actually served during a TLS handshake remain outside this workbench.
After installing a certificate, test the real hostname from the intended clients and confirm that the server sends the correct intermediate chain. Compare the served leaf fingerprint with the local file. Retain the local report as evidence of what was inspected, not as a universal security or availability certificate.